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Abstract Many recent studies have looked at the impact of international migration
on trade and found a significant effect. They posit that migration fosters trade by
lowering costs or by means of a preference bias. However, to my knowledge, market
structure has not as yet been considered. Using data from Switzerland, this paper
empirically assesses the extent to which migration affects trade, taking goods dif-
ferentiation into account. A monopolistic model with a multisector economy
(Chaney in Am Econ Rev 98(41):1707–1721, 2008) is then empirically estimated.
The findings show that market structure explains the different channels through
which migration affects trade.
Keywords Migration  International trade  Market structure  Gravity
JEL classification F10  F22
1 Introduction
The link between migration and trade has been well established by recent literature.
An immigrant can act as an intermediary for information, preferences and networks.
These trade-impacting migration mechanisms1 are generally presented to explain
empirical findings. Yet the mechanisms themselves have not yet been identified
empirically.
S. H. T. Tai (&)
Paris School of Economics, Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on, Sorbonne,
106-112 Blvd de l’Hopital, 75647 Paris, France
e-mail: silvio.tai@malix.univ-paris1.fr
1 See Rauch (2001) for a survey of these mechanisms.
123
Rev World Econ (2009) 145:225–249
DOI 10.1007/s10290-009-0012-7
This paper addresses the question of how migration affects trade and sheds some
light on the mechanisms of preferences and costs. It is an empirical assessment
underpinned by a model of firm heterogeneity in a multisector economy developed
by Chaney (2008). The impact of migration can be studied in greater detail by
considering the role of market structure with sector asymmetry throughout and each
sector’s level of product variety differentiation. Preferences and cost effects are then
analyzed.
The literature endeavors to identify these mechanisms by treating a country’s
exports and imports differently. Basically, it is posited that the network effect
impacts on both exports and imports by lowering costs, and that the preference
effect has an impact solely on imports due to immigrant consumption. This would
imply that migration has a greater effect on imports. However, Sect. 2 shows that
Gould (1994) and Girma and Yu (2002) find migration has a greater effect on
exports while Head and Ries (1998) and Wagner et al. (2002) find that migration has
a greater impact on imports. Whereas the first set of papers studies a small sample
made up largely of rich trade partners, the second set considers all the partners. This
could suggest that, when the entire spectrum of traded products is considered,
migration has a greater impact on imports.
The main contribution of this paper is to consider market characteristics by level
of product differentiation. In the monopolistic competition framework adopted, the
market can reflect all sorts of situations from monopoly to perfect competition with
trade barrier effects differentiated. Any estimation of the migration effect is
distorted if these differences are overlooked. For instance, take a country that
exports highly differentiated products and imports homogeneous ones. Let us say
this country exports watches and imports cocoa. So if immigration impacts more on
imports than exports, the direct conclusion of a stronger effect of immigrants’
preferences in the host country could be inaccurate. Maybe, in this case, the impact
on imports is greater solely because they are structurally made up of products more
likely to be affected by migration. My findings show that the product composition
explains the different immigration effects.
Another contribution is the use of the migratory mirror flow, i.e. data on Swiss
abroad. This kind of data is not readily available, but provides a definitive
verification of migration effects. For example, consider a migration effect on Swiss
imports introduced by foreigners in Switzerland. The corresponding effect should be
found for Swiss people abroad on Swiss exports. In other words, if we assume that
immigrants always raise preferences for the home country, Swiss emigrants should
increase Switzerland’s exports more than its imports.
It is common practice to study migration and trade focusing on just one country
to prevent measurement errors. Although the data used are reliable (bearing in
mind that each country counts immigrants in its own way), two distortions are
created. First, the composition of exports and imports can be different. Rich
countries specialize in the production of more highly differentiated goods, so their
exports are more concentrated in differentiated products than their imports.
Conversely, the countries studied in the literature are those that attract migration
because of their high level of development. This is the second distortion, since the
opposite flow of nationals abroad is overlooked. For example, the studies consider
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solely immigrants in the United States or the United Kingdom but not the opposite
flow of American and British people abroad. These two distortions converge to
create a bias in the comparison of the impact of migration on exports (of
differentiated products) with the impact of immigrants on imports (of homoge-
neous products). My findings show that market structure has to be considered
before any comparison can be made.
This paper focuses on Switzerland, using data from France to make some checks
on endogeneity. Switzerland, to my knowledge, has never been studied for this
kind of research. This is quite surprising given the high proportion of foreigners
and its geographical position in the heart of Europe. Trade–migration effects have
been studied for the United States (Gould 1994; Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999),
Canada (Head and Ries 1998; Wagner et al. 2002), and the United Kingdom
(Girma and Yu 2002). Switzerland has a smaller surface area and greater
population density than the United States and Canada (30 inhab/km2 for the United
States, 3 inhab/km2 for Canada and 177 inhab/km2 for Switzerland2), so one would
expect to find more social interaction in the country boosting the business network
and cultural transmission. An immigrant in Geneva is more likely to interact with
another in Zurich than an immigrant in New York with another in Texas. These
proportional distances are roughly equivalent for the two countries relatively
speaking given their sizes, but correspond in absolute terms to about 290 and
2,290 km, respectively. However, like Switzerland, the United Kingdom also has a
high population density. Yet the greater mobility of European Union nationals3
could well distort migration statistics on EU nationals in the United Kingdom. This
is not the case for Switzerland thus far (and definitely not in the period studied
from 1995 to 2000).
The repercussions of migration have become an issue with the steady increase in
migration in recent decades. In Switzerland, the number of foreigners has been on
the rise since the Second World War, despite a slight adjustment following the 1973
oil crisis. Switzerland wanted to attract immigrants in the early years following
WWII, the situation changed after the 1960s when the country started to adopt more
restrictive immigration policies.4 Despite migration barriers, the foreign population
has grown more sharply than the Swiss population to the astonishing level of 20% of
the country’s population in recent years. New immigrants accounted for 62% of the
net population increase from 1980 to 2000.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the relevant empirical
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical model and specification and Sect. 4
details the data. Section 5 reports on the findings and Sect. 6 presents the
conclusion.
2 Source: United Nations Demographic and Social Statistics http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/
products/dyb/DYB2002/Table03.pdf.
3 http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/nav/fr/citizens/working/free-circulation/index.html.
4 See Melo et al. (2002), Sect. 3 for an overview of Switzerland’s immigration policy.
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2 Relevant literature
2.1 Review: the effect of migration on trade
The literature has been most consistent in its demonstration of robust, trade-
enhancing migration effects.
Gould (1994) is commonly cited as the pioneering study of the empirical
relationship between migration and trade. He studies this link using American trade
data from 1970 to 1986. Gould (1994) considers two basic mechanisms for this
relationship. First, immigrants bring a preference for home-country products, which
would imply an increase in imports in the host country. Second, immigrants bring
foreign market information and contacts with the potential to lower transaction costs
(e.g. by benefiting from the spread of the immigrant language in the host country,
taking advantage of immigrant information on home varieties and preferences, and
acting as go-betweens to strengthen otherwise unsound trade contracts). Gould
(1994) studies the determinants of American trade with 47 countries, most of them
(25) ranked as ‘‘high-income economies’’.5 The restrictive nature of the sample
could well distort certain findings since the market structure of trade is biased
towards the USA’s richest partners. Moreover, its main specification is most
particular in that Gould (1994) regressed the log of trade on b(IMMI/(h ? IMMI))
(where b and h are estimated coefficients and IMMI is the number of immigrants)
and posited that migration always has a stronger impact on exports than on imports.
Nevertheless, he applies the usual log specification in the sensitivity analysis,
finding that imports have a coefficient of 0.439 whereas exports have a coefficient of
0.176.
Girma and Yu (2002) also consider a small sample of countries. They study the
United Kingdom’s trade with 48 countries from 1981 to 1993, considering the same
two mechanisms as above. Like Gould (1994), 22 of the 48 partners are ranked
‘‘high-income economies’’. They find that migration has a greater impact on exports
than on imports. These findings confirm a robust trade-enhancing migration effect.
However, also like Gould, the study contains a high proportion of the UK’s richest
partners, which could well bias the findings and prompt at least a partial
interpretation of the relationship between migration and trade.
Looking at a larger sample of countries, Head and Ries (1998) study the
determinants of Canadian trade with 136 countries over the 1980–1992 period. The
authors also consider preference, superior knowledge and preferential access to
market opportunities as mechanisms underlying the impact of migration on trade.
Their findings contradict Gould (1994) and Girma and Yu (2002). Interestingly, the
broader range of countries reduces the potential bias observed in the studies
presented above. They find that migration has a greater impact on imports than on
exports.
5 In keeping with the 2006 World Bank classification in which 53 countries are ranked as low-income
economies (GNI per capita of $905 or less), 96 countries as middle-income economies (GNI per capita of
$906 to $11,115) and 60 countries as high-income economies (GNI per capita of $11,116 or more).
Source: http://web.worldbank.org.
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Wagner et al. (2002) agree with Head and Ries that migration has a greater effect
on imports than on exports. They look at provincial Canadian trade data (five
provinces) with 160 countries from 1992 to 1995. This approach is very interesting,
since the fixed country effects do not coincide with the fixed trade-pair effect, since
each trade pair corresponds to a Canadian province and a foreign country duo.
The last two papers suggest that, when the sample of countries is representative
enough, migration can be found to have a larger effect on imports than on exports.
This finding is significant and can be interpreted as: over and above preference
effects, when a complete market structure composition is considered, imports cover
a configuration of goods such that their trade is more likely to be affected by
migration. Since none of these studies looks at market structure, their findings could
reflect a distortion introduced by the difference in market structure between exports
and imports.
Rauch and Trindade (2002) address this subject from a different angle. They
estimate the effect of Chinese networks around the world based on the probability of
finding a Chinese immigrant in the population of each country. In addition, they
make a distinction between differentiated and homogeneous goods. The paper
studies the trade of 63 countries in 1980 and 1990. The findings show that migration
has a stronger effect on differentiated products.
2.2 Are these mechanisms consistent?
The causal effect of migration on trade is well founded. Nevertheless, the
identification of the channels through which migration affects trade flows and the
differences between the impact of migration on exports and imports are not very
clear.
The preference mechanism is based entirely on immigrant consumption of home-
country products. The first problem with this definition is the extremely small scale
of this personal consumption compared with the corporate operations involved in
cost reductions. Head and Ries (1998)6 find that each immigrant generates $8,000 in
imports and $3,000 in exports. This would mean that each immigrant in Canada
consumes an astounding (8,000–3,000)/12 = $417 per month in home-country
products, due purely to their home-country preferences, and that immigrants
consume almost twice as much as firms in trade. An asymmetric network effect could
be considered to explain this difference, for example, a larger impact of networks on
imports. However, Wagner et al. (2002, p. 511) consider a symmetric effect:
One mechanism applies only to imports, not exports. Immigrants may prefer
certain goods from their country of origin, based on tastes developed before
migration. These preferences would generate more imports from the country
of origin.
Head and Ries’ and Duvenly and Hutchinson’s results imply that the
preference effect is approximately double the information/enforcement effect
6 Head and Ries (1998) present the most significant difference of the effect of migration on exports and
imports (they are statistically different at the 95% level).
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(since the immigration effect on imports is approximately three times the effect
on exports).
The second problem with this definition of preferences is that it disregards
cultural transmission. This oversight could create some sizeable misrepresentations,
since cultural transmission reaches a much broader range of people. Immigrant
consumption is quantitatively limited to the number of immigrants, while cultural
spread can potentially reach the entire community in the host country.
The third problem is the unidirectional limitation of this concept of preference,
due to the immigrant consumption assumption (applied solely in the direction of
host country to home country). Nonetheless, the simple matching of immigrants
with host country reveals an immigrant’s choice. This option is obviously
determined by economic factors and circumstances, but affinity between countries
should not be overlooked. Moreover, cultural traits are diffused in two directions:
immigrants bring customs and values from the home country to the host country, but
also from the host country to the home country. Bowles (1998) considers migration
as an instrument of exposure to culture via different populations.
While previous studies have considered a narrow concept of preferences, I
incorporate the notions above into a theoretical model of trade. Basically, the main
difference in the model is the flexibility of the preference term, which is allowed to
work bilaterally. Nevertheless, confirmation of this ‘‘two-way’’ characteristic of
preferences is an econometric issue.
3 Theoretical model and specification
3.1 Trade model
This empirical study is underpinned by a monopolistic competition model with firm
heterogeneity and a multisector economy. The mechanisms via which migration
affects trade imply a reduction in trade costs and an increase in preferences, which
vary according to the market structure. Hence the model needs to distinguish sector-
based differences, trade costs and preferences. One way to take into account these
sector-based differences is to include a fixed export cost with firm heterogeneity by
sector. This allows for extensive and intensive margins of trade whose impact varies
with the extent of product substitutability. Consequently, fixed and variable costs are
separated out to paint a clearer picture of the migration network’s impact on costs.
Chaney (2008) develops a model with all these characteristics save the
preferences term. I describe this model briefly and add a simple term aij for
preferences between countries. This procedure is in keeping with Combes et al.
(2005), where a weight is introduced in order to describe bilateral preferences
between countries. This term means that preferences can be captured in both
directions, from the immigrant’s home country to host country and vice versa.7 The
model is outlined below.
7 See Sect. 2 for a justification.
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The model considers a utility function with CES preferences. There are H ? 1
sectors with sector-specific elasticities of substitution rh. H represents the number of
differentiated sectors and the homogeneous good is the numeraire. Considering that
each sector has Xh varieties and that a consumer consumes q0 units of good 0 and
qh(x) units of each variety x of good h, utility is expressed as:
U  ql0o
YH
h¼1
Z
Xh
ðaijqhðxÞÞ
rh1
rh dx
0
B@
1
CA
rh
rh1lh
ð1Þ
with l0 þ
PH
h¼1 lh ¼ 1 and rh [ 1.
Firm productivity / in each sector follows a Pareto distribution dGhð/Þ ¼
ch/
ch1 with cumulative distribution Ghð/Þ ¼ 1  /ch and c[ r - 1. The cost
of producing q units and selling them in country j is:
chijð/Þ ¼
wishij
/
q þ f hij ð2Þ
where wi is the wage.
A demand Eq. 3 can be derived from the utility function considering Yj as the
sum of income in country j with the dividends from firms from j located worldwide.
xhijð/Þ ¼ phijð/Þqhijð/Þ ¼ lhYj
phijð/Þ
aijP
h
j
 !1rh
ð3Þ
where Phj is the price index in sector h for country j and pij is the selling price.
Two trade barriers are considered in the model: a fixed export cost f hij and a
variable cost in ‘‘iceberg’’ form shij. Separating out these two costs is useful to be
able to introduce an effect of market structure on trade differentiated by firm
heterogeneity. Moreover, this form makes for a more suitable consideration of the
effect of migration on trade costs. Cost reduction mechanisms refer to the
preferential access to market opportunities and the contacts an immigrant may have.
For productivity level /, the threshold can be determined from what a firm is able
to export. The productivity cutoff is the zero profits level.
/ijh ¼ kh1
fij
Yj
  1
rh1 wijsij
Pj
ð4Þ
kh1 is a constant by sector. It is described in Table 1 at the end of this section.
The price index is defined by P1rj ¼
PN
k¼1 wkLk
R1
/kj
rh
rh1  wkskj/
 1rh
dGð/Þ;
using the determined threshold:
Phj ¼ kh2  Y
1
ch
 1rh1
j  hhj ð5Þ
with ðhhj Þch 
PN
k¼1 ðYk=YÞ  ðwkskjÞc  fð
c
r11Þ
kj .
Y is world output, Lk the labor income of country k and k
h
2 a constant by sector
described in Table 1.
Demand Eq. 3 with this price index is written:
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xijð/j/ /ijÞ ¼ kh3 
Yj
Y
 rh1
ch  arh1ij 
hj
wisij
 rh1
 /rh1 ð6Þ
kh3 is a constant by sector described in Table 1 at the end of this section. The
aggregate exports are then obtained from the sum of all the firms’ exports:
Xhij ¼ lh 
YiYj
Y
 ar1ij 
wishij
hhj
 !ch
 f hij
  chrh11ð Þ ð7Þ
This model allows for a multisector estimation. Its findings are consequential in
view of the hypothesis that migration increases product preferences and reduces
trade costs. Identifying each sector by its elasticity of substitution, note, first, that
the preference effect is magnified by elasticity. In other words, once a bilateral
preference is defined, consumption will follow this preference so long as the
consumers are not concerned about variety substitution. A good with r = 1 will not
be affected by preferences, since the varieties are not substitutable in this case.
Otherwise, a good with a high value of r will be easily influenced by preferences
since its varieties are substitutable. The elasticity for preferences is:
d lnXij
d lnaij
¼ r 1 ð8Þ
Second, an intensive margin is in operation, meaning that each exporter firm
exports more when trade costs are reduced. This intensive margin is greater for
sectors with a higher elasticity of substitution, which is the classic prediction made
by Krugman (1980). Since competition is higher when products are more
substitutable, a reduction in trade barriers prompts large differences in exports.
Third, with lower export costs, new and less productive firms start to export.
Where r is low, traded products have a high degree of differentiation and firms are
sheltered from competition, reaching large shares of the market. Conversely, where
r is high, competition is high and low productivity is a serious disadvantage such
that the firm can only reach a small share of the market. This is the extensive
margin.
As Chaney shows, the effect of the extensive margin is greater than the effect of
the intensive margin. The elasticity for variable costs sij is
Table 1 Model’s constants by
sector
kh1 ¼ rhlh
  1
rh1 rh
rh1
 
kh2 ¼ ch rh1ð Þch
 
rh
lh
  c
rh11 rh
rh1
 c
1þp
Y
 
kh3 ¼ rhk1r44
kh4 ¼ rhlh 
ch
chðrh1Þ 
1
1þkh5
  1
ch
kh5 ¼
PH
h¼1
ðrh1Þ
ch
lh
rh
1
PH
h¼1
ðrh1Þ
ch
lh
rh
kh ¼ 1 þ kh5
 þ lh
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d lnXij
d lnsij
¼ ðr 1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
intensive margin
þððr 1Þ  cÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
extensive margin
¼ c ð9Þ
and for fixed costs f hij is
d lnXij
d lnfij
¼ 0|{z}
intensive margin
þ 1  cðr 1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
extensive margin
ð10Þ
Hence the general (restricting) effect of trade costs on trade increases with r, as
opposed to preferences.
3.2 Extension for migration
The theoretical model used separates out fixed and variable trade costs. I assume
that migration affects just fixed costs (and preferences). The literature considers two
main channels through which migration could reduce costs: privileged information
about markets and opportunities and contract reinforcement. Both of them represent
a fixed cost to be overcome. The supplier–buyer matching process clearly represents
a fixed cost incurred before any shipment is made. However, contract reinforcement
is less clearly defined as a fixed cost. Confusion can arise since a weak contract can
generate additional variable costs such as ‘‘debased metal, rotting fruits or stocking
with runs’’ (Rauch and Trindade 2002, p. 117), but this is a consequence of the
contract and not the cost of the contract. Business partnership contracts are
nevertheless sealed before shipments are made and their cost should not normally
depend on the volume to be traded.
As regards the total impact of migration on trade, Eq. 11 follows the trade model
incorporating a multisector differentiation where each sector is identified by its
elasticity of substitution. The degree of substitutability will define cost and
preference behaviour.
d lnTradeij
d lnmigij
¼ FðrÞ ð11Þ
The decomposition of migration’s effect on trade in terms of costs and preferences
is written:
d lnðTradeijÞ
d lnðmigijÞ
¼ o lnTradeij
o lnaij
 o lnaij
o lnmigij|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
preference component
þ o lnTradeij
o lnfij
 o lnfij
o lnmigij|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
fixed cost component
ð12Þ
In elasticity notation:sa  olnTradeijolnaij ; am  olnaijolnmigij; sf  olnTradeijolnfij and um  olnfijolnmigij
FðrÞ ¼ sa  am þ sf  um ð13Þ
The impact of migration on trade via the preference channel is determined by two
elasticities: sa and am henceforth named preference (complementary) elasticities.
These two elasticities have a positive sign since I assume that migration has a
positive impact on preferences and preferences have a positive impact on trade.
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Conversely, the impact of migration on trade via the cost channel is determined
by: sf and um henceforth named cost (complementary) elasticities. These two
elasticities have a negative sign since I assume that migration has a negative impact
on costs (reducing costs) and costs have a negative impact on trade (reducing trade).
The product of both of them and then their resulting impact is nonetheless also
positive.
Hence the impact of migration on trade is a linear combination of preference and
cost components. Since one component reaches the maximum value when the other
equals zero, a simple way of writing the linear combination is to weight b to these
maximum values, b [ [0, 1]. Then b = 0 when migration’s entire effect on trade
operates solely via the cost channel and b = 1 when its entire effect operates solely
via the preference channel. Equation 13 becomes:
FðrÞ ¼ b sa  amð Þmax þð1  bÞ  sf  um
 
max
ð14Þ
Plugging Eqs. 8 and 10 into 14:
FðrÞ ¼ b ðr 1Þ  amð Þmax þð1  bÞ  1 
c
r 1
 
 umð Þmax ð15Þ
and
FðrÞ ¼ ðr 1Þ  amð Þmax ¼ 1 
c
r 1
 
 umð Þmax ð16Þ
it follows that:
am ¼ b amð Þmax ) am ¼ b
FðrÞ
r 1 ð17Þ
um ¼ ð1  bÞ  umð Þmax ) um ¼ ð1  bÞ 
FðrÞ
1  cr1
ð18Þ
3.3 Specification
Trade function (7) is estimated using a gravity equation. The first specification
considers an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with traditional control
variables such as population, common border and common language.8 These control
variables are important since migration could spuriously reflect trade channels
established by colonial history or facilitated by a common language and adjacency.
Dyadic variable preferences (aijt), fixed costs (fijt) and variable costs (sij) are
captured by:
aijt ¼ migbDijt distEijexpðAaclangij þ Bacolonyij þ CacbordijÞ
fijt ¼ migð1bÞDijt expðAf langij þ Bf colonyijÞ
sij ¼ distEijexpðAslangij þ Bscolonyij þ CscbordijÞ
8 The colony variable does not apply to Switzerland.
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where9:
X ¼ ðr 1ÞXa þ 1  cr 1
 
Xf þ ðcÞAs for X ¼ A and B
Y ¼ ðr 1ÞYa þ ðcÞCs for Y ¼ C and E
D ¼ bðr 1Þ þ ð1  bÞ 1  c
r 1
 
Country-specific variables are captured by gross domestic product. Time fixed
effects (FEt) are introduced to capture the overall variation in world trade and
technology, concerning mainly transport and communication.
The estimated equation is then:
lnXijt ¼ klnðgdpitÞ þ llnðgdpjtÞ þ mlnðpopÞit
þ dlnðpopÞjt þ A clangij þ B colonyij
þ C cbordij þ D lnmigijt þ E lndij þ FEt þ eij
ð19Þ
Recent methodological progress has improved the estimation of gravity equations.10
Two main improvements are incorporated: omitted variables are captured by
country-specific fixed effects and heteroskedasticity is corrected by a Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator.
Country fixed effects are added in to capture omitted country-specific effects.
This greatly reduces the risk of the migration variable capturing omitted variables.
Despite the popularity of the log–linear form of the gravity equation, it overlooks
heteroskedasticity issues. In fact, the multiplicative form of the gravity equation
provides a stochastic error term that, in its log–linear form, does not violate OLS
homoskedasticity conditions solely under highly specific conditions. Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) propose an exponential form estimated by a PPML estimator to
correct this problem.
Considering these two developments, the estimated equation becomes:
Xijt ¼ exp½klnðgdpitÞ þ llnðgdpjtÞ þ mlnðpopÞit þ dlnðpopÞjt
þ A clangij þ B colonyij þ C cbordij þ D lnmigijt þ E lndij
þ FEt þ FEi þ FEj þ eij
ð20Þ
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity by White’s (1980) method and
clustered by country pairs to take into account the correlation of errors over the
years.
4 Data
I use data mainly from Switzerland, although data from France are also used in a
robustness check. In both cases, my data describe foreigners in the country
(Switzerland or France) and nationals (Swiss or French) abroad.
9 For the sake of clarity, sector h indices are omitted henceforth.
10 For more details, see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Feenstra (2004), and Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006).
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The use of migration stock instead of flows avoids the problem of endogeneity
raised by reverse causality or even by a missing agent. Moreover, migration flows
would disregard resident stock, which has an influence on current economic
outcomes.
The Swiss Federal Statistics Office and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs provided the data for Switzerland. The data for France come from a census11
and the French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs. For the sake of data
comparability, this paper uses data on the period from 1995 to 2000 with the
exception of data on immigrants in France, where only 1999 data are used due to
availability and compatibility problems.
The number of immigrants in Switzerland is measured in mid-year, while Swiss
emigrants are counted at the end of the year. This is why the number of immigrants
is analyzed with a six-month lag such that, for example, 2000 data (collected in
June/July) are considered as 1999 data.
The trade data used in this article are taken from NBER, United Nations Trade
Data (Feenstra et al. 2005). This database provides four-digit SITC data aggregated
into three digits for matching with the elasticity of substitution database.
The elasticities of substitution are based on the United States elasticities
estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) as proxies. Data on elasticities of
substitution for each country are not available. Instead, the United States elasticities
are used as proxies because of the country’s representability in the world economy.
The sector-based trade data present some very high, broadly scattered elasticities.
Figure 1 of Sect. 5 shows that just 6.3% of imports and 4.0% of exports have an
elasticity higher than nine spread in a sigma interval from 9 to 33. These data are
ultimately not considered,12 as explained in Sect. 5 mainly because of their high
dispersion and substantial potential for biasing the results.
Bilateral distances are calculated as the sum of the distances between the largest
cities of both countries, weighted by the share of the population living in each city.
Geographical variables such as common border (a dummy variable set to 1 for pairs
of countries that share a border) and common language (dummies equal to one if
both partners share a language) are extracted from the CEPII database.13
The data on gross domestic product and population are taken from the World
Bank World Development Indicators.
11 Source: INSEE, National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, France.
12 A total of 10.1% of imports and 18% of exports were deleted from the sector-based analysis for other
reasons. Some NBER trade data sectors do not match with the elasticities data: 3.8% of imports and
11.7% of exports. In the case of exports, one code (900) alone accounts for 7.8% of this 11.7%. The
authors of the trade database assume that the breakdown of Sect. 9 is essentially meaningless and reflects
the reporting country’s unwillingness to provide the product detail and, in some cases, partner detail as
well. Therefore, these data are not included in the estimations.
13 http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
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5 Findings
5.1 The impact of immigrants on Switzerland’s aggregate trade
Taking first a conventional approach, Table 2 reports the findings on the effect of
immigrant stocks on Switzerland’s aggregate exports and imports. Columns (1) and
(2) show the results of the basic OLS gravity equation for Switzerland imports and
exports, respectively. The gravitational determinants are more or less equivalent for
both flows except for partner population and adjacency. For a given level of GDP,
the partner population affects exports negatively and has no statistical effect on
imports. Given that per capita GDP measures level of development, this fact implies
that Switzerland exports more to countries with a higher level of development while
this criterion is indifferent for imports. Adjacency affects Switzerland’s imports
only and does not influence exports. Common language does not have an impact on
trade, probably due to the fact that Switzerland is a multilingual country. For
example, a French-speaking region of Switzerland does not have a language
advantage over a German-speaking country, although the ‘‘common language’’
dummy assumes it nonetheless. Yet the correlation between language and common
border is 0.32, which could justify a colinearity between these two variables. To
sum up, Swiss products are consumed more by richer countries and the implications
of a common border affect imports only.
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Fig. 1 Switzerland’s sigma specialization. This graph calculates sector trade for each integer r
(elasticity of substitution) from 1995 to 2000. This quantity is then divided by total trade. For example,
the first bar is calculated as the sum of the trade of all sectors between r = 1.00 and r = 1.99 and this
amount is then divided by total trade
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Regressions (3) and (4) introduce the logarithm of the stock of immigrants in
Switzerland. The other variables have broadly the same effect on exports and
imports, comparatively speaking. It is worth noting that the distance coefficient and
its level of significance are smaller than in the previous regressions. Immigrant
stocks seem to capture some information associated with distance. In this basic
specification, immigrants have a greater influence on imports than on exports, even
though this difference is not statistically significant. While this OLS estimator is
appropriate for comparisons with other studies and provides a view of the
gravitational determinants of Swiss trade, it is not the best specification for
identifying the impact of immigrants in particular. The next specification takes into
account omitted variables and heteroskedasticity issues.
Regressions (5) and (6) are estimated by a PPML and country fixed effects are
included. Country fixed effects control for missing variables that could bias the
migration coefficient, as explained in Sect. 3. Yet this methodology also controls for
the dyadic dimension, since the trade concerns just one country. So all the dyadic
variables such as distance and adjacency are colinear to these fixed effects and are
not significant, even though they are included to ensure a complete control of the
migration variable. The second upshot of this methodology is that it overcontrols for
the impact of migration, resulting in underestimated coefficients for this variable.
This disadvantage in terms of the coefficient’s accuracy actually plays a positive
role for its confidence, as applied by Gould (1994).
In regressions (5) and (6) we find a significant impact of immigrants on trade. A
10% increase in the stock of immigrants raises exports by 2.69% and imports by
3.03%. This difference is not statistically significant, but it tends to confirm the
findings made by Head and Ries (1998) and Wagner et al. (2002).
Yet the inclusion of fixed effects could raise a potential endogeneity issue given
the variations in the migration variable over time (with dyadic fixed effects). This is
a problem because the change in migration over time (basically the migration flows)
may well tie in with the trade flows. I use two strategies to address this issue: an
instrumental regression with twice-lagged migration stock (see Table 5 in the
appendix) and the inclusion of French data (see Sect. 5.2). All checks confirm the
results obtained in Table 2.
These findings might imply that international flows of people create certain
directional links between countries, links that would be more beneficial to trade
flowing from home country to host country. This means, for example, that a Chinese
immigrant in the United States would contribute more for US imports from China
than for US exports. Since the network can take effect in both directions (although
its effect can be asymmetric), this phenomenon would be conventionally explained
by a preference for home-country product consumption.
5.2 The impact of immigrants on Switzerland’s disaggregated trade
These migration mechanisms are fairly intuitive and have been developed by past
studies. However, these analyses have overlooked the market structure of trade.
Migration could affect exports and imports of different sectors in a systematically
different way. Then, migration mechanisms could be distinguished only if the
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degree of trade flow substitutability were the same. One way of testing this assertion
is to pool sector-based trade considering each sector as a good with differentiated
varieties. Consequently, the interaction with the sector elasticity of substitution
could verify the impact of the market structure.
Before proceeding to these estimations, it is worth analyzing the trade
distribution of these sectors. Figure 1 shows the share of Swiss exports and imports
by integer r. The data for the values of r are provided by Broda and Weinstein
(2006). The graph shows the distribution of Switzerland’s trade on r, and especially
the concentration of exports in more differentiated products (low values of r).
Turning now to the estimation of disaggregated sector-based export and import
data from 1995 to 2000, the most reliable estimator (PPML) is used for this
regression with the trade data being derived from Feenstra (2005). Elasticity-of-
substitution statistics are not available for each country, so data on the United States
are used as proxies. Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate these elasticities for the
period from 1990 to 2000.
This estimation corresponds to function (11). This function assumes a polynomial
form:
FðrÞ ¼ f0 þ f1  rþ f2  r2 þ    þ fn  rn
where f0, …, fn are migration terms of interaction.
A small number of interactions make for a more general estimator. A high value
of n customizes the estimation by incorporating part of the errors into the
predictions. Alternatively, the first derivative of preference elasticity is always
negative if r’s exponent is less than 2. This could be problematic because it could
permanently induce a behaviour not predicted by the theoretical model. Squared r is
then taken for the estimations. Higher powers were tested (results available upon
request), but the results were not robust to the different databases used in this
article.14
The pooled estimation presents a very uneven distribution of data. Figure 1
clearly shows that most of the data (95%) are concentrated in a narrow range from
r = 1 to r = 9, while a residual amount of trade is spread in a large interval from
r = 9 to r = 33.15 Table 3 reports on the migration variable coefficients for the
three samples: all data, r\ 9, and 9 \r\ 33. The estimator used is the PPML
with all dummies and controls applied so far. Migration influences trade in the entire
sample and the second sample. The coefficients and their degree of significance are
similar. Data from the third sample are therefore not included in the following
estimations.
Table 4 presents the results of the disaggregated sector data regressions for
exports and imports. Migration is then interacted twice with r and r2. Columns (1)
to (4) report on the findings for Switzerland, and columns (5) and (6) add data from
14 These databases are: Swiss people abroad, foreigners in France and French people abroad.
15 These outliers can considerably disrupt the findings. Since the estimates are made based on r’s
interaction, the ‘‘leverage’’ of these points on r is high. Moreover, the spread is too diffuse: there are four
points (counting by integer r) in the interval from r = 9 to r = 33. No regression could be representative
in this case.
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France for an endogeneity check. The data on immigrants in France are available for
1999 only and on French people abroad for the period 1995–2000. The pooling of
data on these two countries is useful because it tones down the effect of country
fixed effects. These fixed effects could cause endogeneity because, in the presence
of just one country, they also are dyadic fixed effects, which are colinear to the
cross-sectional dimension of the migration variable. The results for the migration
interacted terms are quite similar to those found in columns (1) to (4), suggesting
that there is little endogeneity. This fact, combined with the results of the
instrumental regression on Swiss immigration in Table 5 in the appendix, validates
the estimated results obtained. This robustness also validates the functional form of
F(r) with terms to the power of 1 and 2.16
Country and time fixed effects are applied and a dummy variable is included for
imports in order to control for size difference effects for exports and imports. The
results for Switzerland in columns (1)–(4) show, as expected, that the dyadic
variables’ coefficients are not significant. Columns (1) and (2) present the findings
for exports and imports, respectively. The composition of trade of the sectors seems
to determine the impact of migration similarly on imports and on exports. The
interaction terms have a significant coefficient (at the 99% level) and generate
similar parabolas. Both point out that intermediate values of r (3.59 and 3.83)
correspond to a maximum impact (0.27 and 0.28). Above the asymmetry between
imports and exports, migration impacts on trade depend largely on the sector. This
could be verified by pooling together exports and imports into one regression. Such
specification provides a robustness check for the effects of sector differentiation
with a more complete distribution of trade on r. The products of some sectors are
only exported or imported, and then exports and imports present individually an
incomplete range of sectors. Results presented in column (3) confirm previous
results. These results can be expressed in elasticity notation as follows:
FðrÞ ¼ olnðTradeÞ
olnðImmigÞ ¼ 0:178  r 0:023  r
2 ð21Þ
Table 3 Sector-pooled estimation: restricting the sample
Dependent variable Exp and imp pooled
Sample All Data r\ 9 r[ 9
Model (1) (2) (3)
ln Immigrants 0.191** 0.181** 0.583
ln Switzerland (0.091) (0.089) (0.410)
Observations 74457 70735 3722
Available trade (%) 100% 94.9% 5.1%
Note: Robust standard errors (country-pair clustered) in parentheses with *, ** and *** respectively
denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Time and country dummies are included in all esti-
mations. All models are estimated by PPML
16 A test to the power of 3 (not reported) failed this same test.
The link between migration and trade 241
123
T
ab
le
4
E
x
p
o
rt
s
an
d
im
p
o
rt
s
d
is
ag
g
re
g
at
ed
:
si
g
m
a
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
S
p
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
P
P
M
L
S
w
is
s’
F
re
n
ch
an
d
S
w
is
s’
E
x
p
o
rt
s
Im
p
o
rt
s
E
x
p
an
d
im
p
p
o
o
le
d
E
x
p
an
d
im
p
p
o
o
le
d
M
o
d
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
-
5
.7
4
1
*
*
*
(1
.2
1
5
)
–
1
1
.8
8
0
*
*
*
(3
.3
0
2
)
-
6
.8
7
2
*
*
*
(1
.6
6
3
)
3
.8
6
4
(4
.0
1
8
)
-
1
6
.6
1
4
*
*
*
(3
.6
4
7
)
-
1
4
.3
7
3
(1
2
.1
9
8
)
ln
p
ar
tn
er
G
D
P
0
.6
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.1
1
5
)
0
.2
9
4
(0
.2
2
3
)
0
.4
8
3
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
3
)
0
.4
1
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
2
)
0
.5
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
9
)
0
.5
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
5
)
ln
co
u
n
tr
y
G
D
P
0
.5
2
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
9
)
0
.7
0
6
*
*
*
(0
.3
1
9
)
ln
p
ar
tn
er
P
o
p
.
-
0
.3
3
8
(0
.6
4
1
)
0
.3
8
7
(0
.9
1
5
)
-
0
.2
7
5
(0
.6
1
3
)
-
0
.0
8
7
(0
.5
4
8
)
-
0
.2
4
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
6
)
-
0
.5
1
6
(0
.4
9
8
)
ln
d
is
ta
n
ce
0
.7
7
7
(1
.3
1
8
)
0
.6
6
7
(2
.4
9
0
)
1
.1
6
5
(1
.3
2
1
)
-
0
.6
6
1
(1
.4
1
4
)
0
.2
4
3
(0
.1
7
0
)
0
.0
8
2
(0
.1
6
6
)
A
d
ja
ce
n
cy
0
.6
2
9
(3
.2
3
6
)
0
.7
1
8
(8
.5
1
1
)
3
.3
1
1
(4
.3
5
6
)
-
2
.5
7
5
(4
.5
2
8
)
1
.0
9
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
6
9
)
1
.2
0
4
*
*
*
(0
.1
2
5
)
C
o
m
m
o
n
la
n
g
u
ag
e
0
.6
8
7
(2
.4
1
9
)
1
.2
5
1
(4
.8
7
3
)
-
1
.0
9
1
(3
.4
9
4
)
1
.9
9
7
(3
.0
9
6
)
-
0
.1
2
9
(0
.1
2
4
)
0
.0
2
2
(0
.1
2
7
)
C
o
lo
n
ia
l
li
n
k
s
0
.0
5
4
(0
.0
7
0
)
0
.1
0
0
(0
.0
8
4
)
ln
im
m
ig
ra
n
ts
in
co
u
n
tr
y
-
0
.0
7
4
(0
.0
8
9
)
0
.0
6
5
(0
.1
8
8
)
-
0
.0
6
5
(0
.1
0
8
)
-
0
.0
4
8
(0
.0
7
3
)
ln
im
m
i.
9
si
g
m
a
0
.1
3
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
0
)
0
.1
5
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
5
)
0
.1
7
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
3
)
0
.1
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
8
)
ln
im
m
i.
9
si
g
m
a2
-
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
-
0
.0
2
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
-
0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
-
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
ln
n
at
io
n
al
s
ab
ro
ad
0
.2
3
9
(0
.1
6
7
)
-
0
.2
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
8
2
)
ln
n
at
io
n
.
9
si
g
m
a
0
.1
2
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
0
)
0
.1
5
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
7
)
ln
n
at
io
n
.
9
si
g
m
a2
-
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
-
0
.0
1
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
S
ig
m
a
-
2
.2
7
5
*
*
*
(0
.3
8
5
)
-
1
.7
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.4
9
3
)
-
2
.3
2
5
*
*
*
(0
.3
3
9
)
-
1
.7
8
4
*
*
*
(0
.3
5
4
)
-
1
.4
6
3
*
*
*
(0
.3
6
6
)
-
1
.4
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.3
3
3
)
S
ig
m
a2
0
.2
6
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
3
)
0
.2
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
5
9
)
0
.2
7
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
0
)
0
.2
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
1
)
0
.1
6
6
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
0
)
0
.1
7
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
3
4
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
F
E
-
0
.0
2
0
(0
.1
1
4
)
-
0
.0
1
8
(0
.1
1
4
)
0
.1
1
9
*
*
(0
.0
5
9
)
0
.1
0
2
*
*
(0
.0
4
7
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
4
3
,5
4
8
2
7
,1
8
7
7
0
,7
3
5
7
0
,4
8
4
3
2
,9
4
9
1
9
2
,5
4
7
N
o
te
:
R
o
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
(c
o
u
n
tr
y
-
p
ai
r
cl
u
st
er
ed
)
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
w
it
h
*
,
*
*
an
d
*
*
*
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
d
en
o
ti
n
g
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s.
T
im
e
an
d
co
u
n
tr
y
d
u
m
m
ie
s
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
es
ti
m
at
io
n
s.
A
ll
m
o
d
el
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
b
y
P
P
M
L
242 S. H. T. Tai
123
Therefore, F(r) has the same shape for the three specifications, indicating a
robust relationship. A last test is conducted in column (4). Data on the Swiss abroad
are used to estimate the effect of these emigrants on Switzerland’s exports and
imports. So far I have considered the immigration to Switzerland, which could
select a kind of immigrant who looks for a higher level of development. Results
confirm that the functional form of Eq. 21 holds independently of a possible
idiosyncrasy bias of migrants.
5.2.1 Disentangling migration effects
Substituting F(r) in Eqs. 17 and 18, we obtain:
am ¼ b 0:178r 0:023r
2
r 1
um ¼ ð1  bÞ 0:178r 0:023r
2
1  cr1
The relationship between migration and market structure is identified based on the
theoretical model: sa ¼ r 1 and sf ¼ 1  cr1.
Maintaining c = 9 in order to respect the model’s conditionc[ r 1, Fig. 2
charts the overall impact of migration on trade (top graph) and the partial effects of
migration on trade by costs and preferences (bottom graph). Since b is not
estimated, this analysis applies b = 50%, which simulates a situation where 50% of
migration effects channel through costs and 50% through preferences.17
Some direct conclusions can be drawn from Fig. 2. First, the total elasticity of
migration with respect to trade comes to a maximum of 0.17 ? 0.17 = 0.34,
meaning that a 10% increase in the stock of immigrants raises trade by up to 3.4%.
Second, to disentangle the impacts, the direct effects of migration on preferences
(am) and on costs (um) are very small compared to the subsequent effect of
preferences on trade (sa) and the effect of costs on trade (sf). This is quite natural:
preferences and costs can have a huge effect on trade while migration slightly biases
preferences and costs. To quantify these effects, at the abovementioned peak level, a
10% change in preferences and costs prompts a 20% and -15% change in trade,
respectively. A 10% change in the stock of immigrants implies a 0.8% change in
preferences and -1.1% in costs.
In addition, this paper’s theoretical model finds that the effect of preferences on
trade (sa) increases with r. This happens because homogeneous products are more
easily replaceable for a given level of formed preferences. It is a substitutability
effect. The model also finds that the impact of costs on trade (sf) decreases with r
due to the extensive margin. The extensive margin predicts that a reduction in trade
barriers enables new exporters of differentiated goods to reach larger shares of the
market than new exporters of homogeneous goods. The impact of migration on
preferences (am) then decreases with r while it affects costs (um) in an inverted U-
shape. This shape is highly asymmetric and concentrated in high values of r, with a
maximum of r = 6.1 converging very quickly to zero.
17 Relative behaviour between complementary elasticities does not change for any value of b.
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These findings imply that preferences are more affected by migration in
differentiated sectors (with low elasticity of substitution). For example, a migrant
might influence preferences for watches and clocks (sector 885 with r = 1.34) to a
greater extent than cocoa (sector 072 with r = 7.76). It seems logical that migration
should have a greater effect on preferences for differentiated products, since they
can be more easily distinguished and identified by their nationality of origin. At the
opposite extreme of the equation where r = ??, migration has no effect on
preferences since there is just one choice of variety that is constant across all the
nationalities. The corresponding migration mechanisms in this case are the
transmission of preferences such as cultural transmission and information
transmission (about a new variety). Immigrant consumption of home-country
products also has an influence, albeit lesser, on these preferences.
The second finding is that migration has an increasing impact on costs for more
homogeneous goods up to a break point from where the impact of migration on
costs diminishes quickly. These products may benefit from a trade channel
established by migration, even if their trade is not sensitive to preferences. In this
Fig. 2 The relationship between migration, costs and preferences
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case, migration reduces the fixed export costs, allowing for the entry of new
exporters. The explanation for this behaviour is that more differentiated products
require more specialized transactions. For example, the supplier–buyer match is
more complex for ‘‘optical instruments’’ (sector 871 with r = 1.05) than for ‘‘soap’’
(sector 554 with r = 4.95). Trade barriers will be harder to overcome for the former
because of the need for highly specific knowledge about the market and transport.
So, the more homogeneous a product, the simpler the trade barriers and the more
easily an immigrant can overcome the trade barriers. At higher r values, the
transactions become so straightforward that there is little leeway for migration
effects. Rauch and Trindade (2002) defines homogeneous goods as being those
traded on organized exchanges, which clearly incorporate much of the potential
intermediation an immigrant could perform. The corresponding mechanism for the
effects of migration on costs is the formation of networks, i.e. the relationship
between immigrants and those who have remained in the country of origin, which
could generate new exports.
However, it could be useful to analyze the direct effect of the elasticity of
substitution on trade. This impact is expressed by18:
lnðTradeÞ ¼ 2:325  rþ 0:178  lnðImmigÞ  rþ 0:275  r2  0:023
 lnðImmigÞÞ  r2
This function is plotted in Fig. 3. It predicts that, in the absence of migration, the
effect is not monotonous: for low values of r, trade is an increasing function of
product differentiation, whereas for high values of r, trade is a decreasing function
of product differentiation. So highly differentiated products are traded more because
of the exclusivity of their origins. Conversely, extremely homogeneous products can
be easily substituted. Intermediate products are neither exclusive nor replaceable
enough and are therefore traded less.
Fig. 3 The impact of r on trade
18 Still considering the reference regression (3) in Table 4.
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It is interesting to note that an increase in the number of migrants drives up the
effect on trade until it eventually becomes linear and monotonous: where there are
high numbers of migrants, trade is an increasing function of product differentiation
for any r.
5.2.2 Defining the predominant effects of migration on trade
Once these direct migration relationships have been clarified, we can define how
complementary elasticities diverge. On the cost side, network and extensive margin
have mostly opposite effects on trade as r increases. Figure 2 shows that the
network effect is mostly an increasing function of r while the extensive margin
effect is a decreasing function of r. On the preferences side the substitutability
effect is an increasing function of r while the cultural transmission effect is a
decreasing effect of r. Differentiating Eq. 13 on r, we can determine predominating
effects according to r:
oF
or
¼ osa
or
am þ oamor sa
 
þ osf
or
um þ
oum
or
sf
 
Each term osaoram;
oam
or sa;
osf
orum and
oum
or sf is presented in Fig. 4.
For the sectors with r[ 3.8719 the cultural transmission effect predominates the
preference channel and the extensive margin effect predominates the cost channel.
For the sectors with r\ 3.87 the substitutability effect predominates the preference
channel and the network effect predominates the cost channel. This means that, for
an increase of r, the proportional increase in ‘‘substitutability’’ will overcompensate
Fig. 4 Partial effects of migration, b = 0.5
19 3.87 is the point maximizing the impact of migration on trade, determined by Eq. 21. It is where
osa
oram ¼ oamor sa and osforum ¼ oumor sf .
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the decrease in ‘‘preference transmission’’. This is roughly the case for Switzerland,
with an average r = 2.9 for exports and r = 3.4 for imports, imports being more
affected by migration because of the higher substitutability of their products, even
though preferences for exported products are greater than those for imported
products. This is a very surprising result. It demonstrates that cultural and
information transmission have a much greater impact on defining preferences than
the immigrant’s individual consumption. Moreover, this transmission clearly moves
in both directions, from home country to host country and from host country to
home country. Conversely, the ‘‘network’’ effect in the cost channel overcompen-
sates the ‘‘extensive margin’’. Whereas the ‘‘extensive margin’’ is beneficial to
exports, the immigrant ‘‘network’’ effect has more of an impact on imports. In this
case, the network effect predominates, raising imports more than exports.
6 Conclusion
This paper conducts an empirical study of the effects of migration on trade using a
new approach that considers the market structure of exports and imports and
inference mechanisms such as cultural and information transmission and network
formation.
Swiss and French migration data are used along with sector-based trade data. The
market structure is then studied in terms of these sectors’ differentiation as shown
by their elasticity of substitution. A suitable theoretical model taking into account
sector heterogeneity based on Chaney (2008) predicts how preferences and costs
vary as a sector’s substitutability level varies.
The findings are in keeping with comparable studies insomuch as migration has a
greater effect on imports than on exports. However, a multisector analysis
interacting migration with the elasticity of substitution suggests that market
structure determines to a large extent how migration affects trade. Migration is
found to influence preferences more in differentiated products and impact costs in
an inverted U-shape, being more intense in products with an elasticity of
substitution close to 6 and less intense as this elasticity approaches 1 or 7.8.
Switzerland’s imports are more affected by migration than its exports. As regards
the preference channel, this happens because Swiss imported goods are more
substitutable and hence more easily affected by preferences. As regards the fixed-
cost channel, this happens because imported goods call for more straightforward
trade transactions that immigrants are more able to intermediate. The residual effect
of migration on preference enhances preferences for Swiss products because of its
highly differentiated composition.
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Appendix
Table 5 Instrumental variable for immigrants in Switzerland
Specification PPLM
Dependent variable Exp Imp
Model (1) (2)
Intercept -6.81*** (2.40) -7.80*** (2.15)
ln partner GDP 0.80*** (0.15) 0.25 (0.20)
ln partner Pop. 0.01 (0.73) 1.20 (1.09)
ln distance -0.71 (1.54) -1.76 (2.16)
Adjacency -2.29 (8.53) -0.10 (1.28)
Common language 1.22 (5.27) 0.09 (1.98)
ln immigrants in Switz. 0.52* (0.29) 0.84** (0.39)
Observations 878 801
Note: Robust standard errors (country-pair clustered) in parentheses with *, ** and ***, respectively,
denoting significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. Time and country dummies are included in all esti-
mations. All models are estimated by PPML
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